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Citizenship and Social Justice 
Ton Bernts, I Leo d'Anjou, 1 and Dick Houtman 1,2 
Discussions on the problems of the welfare state are increas#~gly framed in 
terms of citizenship rather than social justice. The popularity of the concept 
of citizenship raises" the question of its implications for social justice theory 
and research. In this article it is argued that whereas the dominant approach 
in social justice is essentially individualistic, he concept of citizenship focuses 
rather on individuals as members of a societal community, from which both 
rights and obligations are derived. This focus on communal membership sug- 
gests three important topics for social justice theory and research: (i) the need 
to distinguish between a civic and a justice motive for human behavior, (ii) 
the need to specify the frame of reference respondents should use when they 
make their justice judgments, and (iii) the need to recognize the fact that justice 
judgments may result from both adhering to criteria of justice and considering 
the consequences of their appacation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Justice is commonly perceived as the central moral standard in social 
life. It constitutes, in the famous words of Rawls (1973), the first virtue of 
social institutions. Concepts of social justice are considered the guidelines 
of the way we order our world and perceive and evaluate social interaction. 
It is supposed, therefore, that "violation of our conceptions of justice pre- 
sents a twofold threat: It challenges and weakens the moral base of our 
community and it brings into question the evaluative framework that pro- 
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vides a foundation for our individual and social action" (Deutsch and Steil, 
1988, p. 4). 
Although justice forms the cornerstone of the social fabric, the con- 
cept used in social research to describe this phenomenon has principally 
an individualistic character. Justice is seen here as the fair balance of con- 
tributions and rewards of individuals. This individualistic explanation of so- 
cial cooperation and social order (e.g., Hechter, 1987) has led to profound 
skepticism that goes back as far as Durkheim's (1893/1984) classical riti- 
cism on Spencer. 
In the last decade the interest of social scientists in problems of dis- 
tribution and hence of social justice has been growing. The welfare states 
have been censured severely, mainly for financial reasons. Scarcity has be- 
come a topic for social research, which resulted in the study of "questions 
of distributive justice, individual rights and notions of equality as the basis 
for social reconstruction a d social reform" (Turner, 1990, p. 190). This re- 
newed attention for questions of social justice has been increasingly framed 
in terms of the classic, but until recently almost outmoded, concept of citi- 
zenship. Central in this concept is the notion that citizens are not conceived 
as isolated individuals but as members of a community. They are individuals 
who have both rights that protect hem from the harshness of (economic) 
life and obligations in order to preserve the social community. 
There are indications that citizenship will become a new key concept 
of political discourse and social research. The growing popularity of the 
concept raises the question of the implications the concept of citizenship 
has for theory and research on social justice. To answer this question, we 
first give an account of the dominant approach in contemporary social jus- 
tice theory and research. Then we elaborate on the concept of citizenship 
and the reasons for its revival. In the last section of this paper, we formulate 
some major implications the concept of citizenship holds for theory and 
research on social justice. 
DOMINANT APPROACH IN SOCIAL JUSTICE 
With his book Social Behavior, Homans (1961) set the tone for a dis- 
tinct line of theory and research, viz., the study of social justice. He stated 
the general rule of distributive justice as follows: "A man in an exchange 
relation with another will expect hat the rewards of each man be propor- 
tional to his costs--the greater the rewards, the greater the costs--and that 
the net rewards, or profits, of each man be proportional to his invest- 
ments--the greater the investments, the greater the profit" (p. 75). Next 
Homans observed that individuals "do in fact perceive and appraise their 
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rewards, costs, and investments in relation to the rewards, costs, and invest- 
ments of other men" (p. 76). With this conceptualization Homans brought 
to the fore two notions in relation to justice: (i) the notion that individuals 
compare what they put into relations and get out of them with the inputs 
and outcomes of other individuals in similar situations, and (ii), the notion 
that the rewards of dealing with their fellow men have to be in proportion 
to what they put into those dealings--their nvestments and costs. 
Homans' theorizing on social or distributive justice, with its base in 
Skinner's psychology and utilitarian economics, was readily picked up by 
(social) psychologists. This led to the formulation of equity theory which 
became the main paradigm in the study of social justice (Adams, 1963, 
1965; Walster et al., 1973). In this theory Homans' notions of comparison 
and proportionality were thoroughly formalized into an equity formula 
which states that equity or justice is reached when the ratio of one's inputs 
and outcomes i equivalent to the input-outcome ratios of relevant others. 
Injustice exists when this balance is distorted. This leads to endeavors of 
unjustly treated individuals to restore--in one way or the other--the in- 
put-outcome balance. 
With Homans and the equity theorists the study of social justice has 
gotten its distinctive characteristics. It focuses on the individual and on the 
way she/he compares, judges, and reacts to situations of (in)equity. Social 
justice is studied in experiments--the tradition of (social) psychology. More- 
over, the emphasis lies more on the formal side of equity than on the sub- 
stantive aspects of just situations and distributions, i.e., criteria of justice 
or fairness uch as educational and occupational ttainments or number of 
dependent children. 
In their outstanding overview, Cohen and Greenberg (1982) show that 
there are other justice theories alongside equity theory. Leventhal, for in- 
stance, points to the importance of the criteria by which distributions of out- 
comes are defined and perceived as just. The "contributions rule"--the only 
rule equity theory recognizes--is not the only justice rule people employ. 
They often use rules like equality and need in allocating valued outcomes. 
Moreover, people may not always "try to maintain or restore actual outcomes 
to their deserved levels." There are--in Leventhal's view--situations in which 
people accept injustices (Leventhal, cited in: Cohen and Greenberg, 1982, 
pp. 21-22). 
Lerner (1975, 1977) developed a justice theory that also differs from 
equity theory. He shows that (enlightened) self-interest--the keystone of 
every theory exclusively based on utilitarian notions--is not the only motive 
in human behavior. The insistence that people--alter as well as ego---should 
get what they deserve and what they are entitled to is important as well. 
Justice as equity is only one of the different forms of justice prevalent in 
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human groups. Deutsch (1985) comes to the same conclusion. He sees equity 
theory as a limiting perspective, reflective of the dominant ideology in West- 
ern societies. 
Leventhal, Lerner, and Deutsch, moreover, are more aware of the so- 
cial character of beliefs, values, rules, and attitudes concerning social justice 
than the quity theorists. Still they maintain the emphasis on the individual 
and on experiments. This emphasis i  also revealed in the overviews of T6rn- 
blom and Foa (1983) and of Cook and Hegtvedt (1983). The individualistic 
bias in social justice studies leads to marginal attention for the societal con- 
text. This conclusion holds, notwithstanding the important contribution of 
Berger et al. (1972). They showed that the "justice comparison" did not 
merely involve other individuals but rather generalized others embodied in 
referential structures which "contain information about rewards, or more 
exactly, goal-objects, typically associated with generalized objects." 
This explicit acknowledgment of the social character of distribution 
rules had an important influence on the study of social justice. It led to 
studies in which distribution rules, beliefs about allocation, and referential 
standards are seen as socially determined. These rules or standards consti- 
tute the social context within which individuals act and react, i.e., allocate 
outcomes, judge those as fair, feel or perceive injustice, etc. (see e.g., Cook, 
1975; Jasso and Rossi, 1977; Alves and Rossi, 1978; Cook and Yamagishi, 
1983; Shepelak and Alwin, 1986; Alwin, 1987; Hermkens and Boerman, 
1989; Griffith, 1990). In these studies, however, social justice is still largely 
a question of individuals comparing their situation (or those of others) with 
referential standards which is preferably researched in experiments or in 
factorial surveys. This emphasis on the individual can also be found in two 
papers directed at giving the sociological perspective its due in theory and 
research of social justice (Cook, 1987; Lerner, 1987). 
As Rytina (1986) states, these studies (and the other foregoing social 
justice studies) form a distinct line of research in which the world outside 
the acting and evaluating individuals is taken as given. He shows that there 
is another tradition in the field of justice, viz., the study of collective re- 
sponses to unjust social arrangements and of the way these arrangements 
are socially produced. This line of research remains, alas, according to 
Rytina distinct from the forementioned dominant research tradition. 
It is, however, only fair to say that there are also developments towards 
a more sociological approach within the dominant--individualisticmtradi - 
tion of justice research. First, Tallman and Ihinger-Tallman (1979) and 
Stolte (1987) put forward the importance of properties of the social struc- 
ture, such as division of labor, formation of coalitions, and situations of 
power dependence, for the way justice norms and principles are formed and 
their content is determined. The notion of "relative deprivation" (Runciman, 
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1966) points to another promising avenue for social justice research (Martin 
and Murray, 1983). Especially, the concept of fraternal deprivation--the 
situation of deprivation resulting from comparisons between groups and 
across structural dimensions, such as class, race, and gender--offers possi- 
bilities to widen the scope of social justice to issues of social stratification. 
Second, in relation to this connection between social inequality and 
social justice Shepelak (1989) shows the important role of cultural factors, 
such as dominant ideologies (Klueget and Smith, 1986), principles and 
norms of distributive justice (Hochschild, 1981), or myths, beliefs, or ra- 
tionales (Robinson and Bell, 1978), in justifying (in)equality. Preferences 
for and judgments of allocations are shaped, according to Shepelak, by be- 
liefs about fair shares, meritocracy, and opportunities, which are strongly 
tied to background variables and social position. 
Third, there are attempts to develop individual-level theories of social 
justice into justice theories on the aggregate l vel (Jasso, 1978, 1980, 1989; 
Markovsky, 1985; Gartrell, 1985). Especially, Jasso's notion that the evalu- 
ation of justice by individuals forms the primordial independent variable 
that determines social phenomena, such as the propensity to dissolve, the 
degree of concord or discord, and the rate of conflict in a society, is im- 
portant in assessing the role social (in)justice plays in the functioning of 
society. As Cohen and Greenberg (1982), state "the social collectivity [is] 
characterized by the distribution of 'justice' sentiments characteristic of its 
members . . .  [which] distribution . .. [is] hypothesized to vary with impor- 
tant features of social aggregates" (pp. 25-26). 
The foregoing overview shows that there is a wide diversity in the 
field of the study of social justice regarding the research questions and 
variables that are taken i to account. There is in these studies, however, 
a common kernel which has not changed very much since Homans' pio- 
neering work. Social justice still mainly refers to the comparisons individu- 
als make between their situations and those of (generalized) others. Actions 
are seen as guided by the motive to attain or restore a fair balance between 
inputs and outcomes. This "justice motive" is conceived as the cornerstone 
of the social fabric, a perspective that implicitly assumes ociety to consist 
of a compilation of exchange relationships between otherwise isolated in- 
dividuals. 
THE REEMERGENCE OF THE CONCEPT OF CITIZENSHIP 
As stated in the Introduction, recent discussions on the problems and 
the future of the welfare states are dominated by the concept of citizenship. 
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In this section, we elaborate this concept further, thereby indicating the 
differences with the concept of social justice. 
Citizenship is a product of the long-term process of modernization 
and denotes the equality of the members of the modern nation-state as a 
"societal community." This membership is protected against nonmembers, 
who can only attain the status of citizen when they meet specific conditions. 
Although the attempts of foreigners, immigrants, and refugees to attain 
membership of rich countries are a growing and important problem, we 
do not discuss this matter here (see in this respect e.g., Walzer, 1983), but 
we concentrate on the relevant aspects of the status people possess once 
citizenship is obtained. 
Three different ypes of rights define citizenship as an equal status 
for all and constitute the basis for full membership n modern society (Mar- 
shall, 1965). The first type, the civil rights, was established in the 18th cen- 
tury. These rights refer to the guarantee of individual iberty and equality 
before the law. Next, there are the political rights, i.e., the right to vote and 
the right to stand for election. These rights were established in the 19th 
century. Social rights--established in the 20th century--constitute the third 
type. They entitle people to "the whole range from the right to a modicum 
of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the 
social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the 
standards prevailing in the society" (Marshall, p. 78). 
Civil and political rights can be equally achieved for all members of 
society, irrespective of their individual conditions. They are truly universal, 
since they require no more than the establishment of certain legal and po- 
litical institutions. With respect o social rights, the situation is different. 
Social rights aim at enabling the participation of all members in a national 
community through a government-guaranteed d livery of services and pro- 
visions. Access to these services and provisions is restricted to those citizens 
whose circumstances prevent hem from full participation in the national 
community. 
As legal "claim rights" to government-guaranteed minimum standards 
of income, nutrition, health, housing and education, social rights constitute 
the heart of the welfare state (Wilensky, 1975, p. 1). They suppose an active 
state, which distributes ervices and provisions to citizens in certain condi- 
tions. This is a second important difference with civil and political rights, 
which do not require extensive state action. A third difference is the nec- 
essal3, lack of determinacy of social rights, compared to civil and political 
rights. They are always subject o change or further elaboration (Berting, 
1990, p. 190; Mishra, 1977, pp. 31-32). This indeterminacy is caused by the 
fact that needs are socially constructed by a community that collectively 
defines which circumstances are unacceptable and should thus becompen- 
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sated for. Of course these definitions change over time, e.g., as a conse- 
quence of changes in the capacity of the fiscal basis of the state. Therefore, 
Walzer (1983, pp. 64-65) is right in emphasizing the particularistic character 
of social rights. 
Social rights are thus guaranteed and implemented by an active state, 
which allocates ervices and provisions, thereby compensating as much as 
possible for individual circumstances. This prevents citizens to lead a life 
that is collectively defined as not acceptable. 
In recent discussions about social rights in the Western welfare states 
the idea of citizenship is often--sometimes implicitly--used as a point of 
departure. The central question is whether the currently existing social 
rights do indeed result in full membership of society for all citizens. This 
question forms the background for the reemergence of the concept of citi- 
zenship. Some authors (Schuyt, 1983; Mead, 1986) argue that the existence 
of social rights weakens the awareness of one's social responsibilities which 
has negative consequences for the functioning of the community. We name 
this position communitarian. Others, e.g., Dahrendorf (1988) and Offe 
(1991), argue that the existing social rights are insufficient o ensure social 
participation to all. We name this second position left-libertarian. 
The comrnunitarian approach implies a particularistic point of view. 
Both social rights and social obligations flow, according to this view, from 
the specific traditions of a particular community. A formal and universal 
analysis of social justice in isolation from its wider social context is seen 
as invalid. Rather, the attention is focused on the way in which problems 
of social justice are connected with this context (Walzer, 1983; MacIntyre, 
1988). This perspective suggests that attempts to attain a just distribution 
should not be studied in isolation from their wider social consequences, 
such as the fact that the guarantee of social rights might easily result in a 
neglect of civic responsibilities. 
In a Dutch study on the feelings of people who receive social security, 
Schuyt (1983) found an interesting incongruence between attempts to dis- 
tribute provisions justly and the feelings of justice of those involved. This 
phenomenon was, according to the author, caused bythe fact that the striv- 
ing for a just allocation of provisions required ever more refined rules and 
allocations to increasingly specific categories of citizens. As a consequence, 
it became difficult for people to understand why one person was entitled 
to a specific provision and another person was not. This resulted in feelings 
of injustice. 
We see ourselves confronted with the paradox that the quest for jus- 
tice may cause feelings of injustice and relative deprivation. These feelings 
may even stimulate additional claims leading to a situation wherein citizens 
take a "calculating" stand vis-a-vis a distributing state. Such processes imply 
202 Bernts, d'Anjou, and Houtman 
an undermining of the awareness of civic responsibilities, which are both 
necessary for and presupposed by a smoothly functioning welfare state. 
Mead (1986) takes a slightly different position and argues that the 
problem of the welfare state is not its size but its permissiveness. Tradi- 
tional social policies, he states, have tended to ignore the behavioral prob- 
lems of the poor. By demanding nothing in return for benefits, these 
policies undermine the capacity of those involved to function properly, re- 
suiting in a lack of social integration in mainstream society. Therefore, he 
argues, it is necessary to change existing social policies in such a way as 
to require the poor to meet certain standards of social functioning in ex- 
change for the support given. More attention should thus be given to the 
social obligations attached to citizenship, especially work and education: 
"the federal programs that support the disadvantaged and unemployed 
have been permissive in character, not authoritative. That is, they have 
given benefits to their recipients but have set few requirements for how 
they ought to function in return . . . There is good reason to think that 
recipients subject to such requirements would function better" (Mead, 
1986, p. 1). 
Both Schuyt and Mead argue that the provision of social rights can 
undercut people's sense of responsibility. This claim reveals that the 
strengthening of the community rather than the xtension of social rights 
is seen as the ultimate political aim. From this communitarian perspective 
the sanctioning of those who fail to fulfill their social obligations is not 
legitimated by a principle of "equity." Rather, it is seen as a necessary 
correction of unacceptable behavior for the sake of the individual and the 
community. Bernts' (1988) study about opinions with respect o the distri- 
bution of health care indicates that such a communitarian motive for sanc- 
tioning exists. 
The left-libertarian position with respect o social rights in the welfare 
state refers to social integration and citizenship as well. In this case, the 
individual citizen with his need for liberty and social participation is the 
point of departure. Authors like Dahrendorf (1988) and Offe (1991) stress 
the fact that the existing social rights do not lead to full membership of 
society for all: "Persistent poverty and long-term unemployment are new 
issues of citizenship, and the old instruments of the social state do not 
seem able to cope" (Dahrendorf, 1988, p. 45). Poverty and unemployment 
have led to an "underclass" in Western countries (Wilson, 1987; Engbersen, 
1990), which is largely cut off from mainstream society. This raises impor- 
tant questions concerning the content of citizenship. 
An important part of the problem is the fact that a reasonably paid 
job means far more than a way to make one's living. In modern Western 
society it is the dominant mode of social integration and social participation 
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and therefore also an important precondition f r full membership of the 
national community. For this reason, unemployment can only partially be 
compensated for by government programs that secure a minimum income 
to those who are out of work. Though both Dahrendorf and Offe value 
the progressive weakening of the linkage between market position and life 
chances as a consequence of the extension of social rights, they claim that 
this development has not kept certain categories of citizens from margin- 
atity and social isolation. 
The establishment of a government-guaranteed right to work, how- 
ever, is very difficult, at least when we reject the possibility that the state 
hires all unemployed, which recently is proposed under the name of "work- 
fare." The difficulty results mainly from the fact that "no judge can force 
employers to hire unemployed people" (Dahrendorf, p. 148). Downward 
flexibility of real wages which is conforming to the requirements of the 
market provides an alternative option for attaining full employment. How- 
ever, this strategy easily results in large-scale poverty, as experiences in the 
United States show: "Persistent poverty is the American equivalent to per- 
sistent unemployment in Europe" (p. 149). Since work remains a significant 
key to income and to full membership of society, Dahrendorf argues for 
the need to redistribute work, thus enabling those who currently remain 
in the margin, to participate fully in social life. 
The relevance attached to individual liberty and individual needs, 
which made us label this position "left-libertarian," leads both Dahrendorf 
and Offe to argue for the establishment of a basic income, i.e., a right to 
income for all citizens independent of their inclination to accept paid em- 
ployment. Especially Offe (1991) elaborated this proposal, which is not 
based upon employees' rights and duties, but upon citizens' rights and du- 
ties. Offe, like Dahrendorf, does accept forms of community service as a 
social obligation, as long as these are effectuated in the public domain. 
The left-libertarian position focuses on the need for social participa- 
tion and liberty of the individual citizen, whereas the communitarian po- 
sition gives most attention to the community as a political ideal. However, 
we should not fail to see an important similarity, viz., the assumption that 
individuals together (should) constitute a community, the membership of 
which gives rise to both social rights and social obligations. According to 
both positions, modern society cannot and should not be conceived as 
merely an aggregation of exchange relationships between isolated individu- 
als. Both are trying to "bring society back in," in contrast o Homans' (1964) 
ambition of "bringing men back in." 
This means that a "civic motive" is seen as important alongside the 
"justice motive." The civic motive can be defined as an awareness of the 
fact that all citizens are part of a national community, from which both 
204 Bernts, d'Anjou, and Houtman 
their own and other's ocial rights and social obligations are derived. The 
existence of this civic motive has, as we demonstrate in the next section, 
several important implications for theory and research on social justice. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND RESEARCH 
ON SOCIAL JUSTICE 
In the first section of this paper we analyzed the object of the con- 
temporary, dominant approach in social justice theory and research. This 
object consists of the evaluations individuals make of the balance between 
their inputs and outcomes in the process of social interaction. Standards 
and criteria which constitute the basis for these evaluations are derived 
from a comparison of oneself with relevant others. The weight of these 
standards and criteria or the choice of the specific group of reference may 
vary according to the agreed upon definition of the situation. Workers, for 
instance, when judging the fairness of their income, have the choice to com- 
pare themselves with colleagues in the same factory, with other workers in 
the same factory who perform different asks, or with people having dif- 
ferent jobs in different factories. In all three instances a particular social 
context is defined as the source of the relevant criteria and, at the same 
time, as the range of their validity. But regardless of the agreed upon defi- 
nition of the situation, it is always the individual who ultimately constitutes 
the norm on which the justice evaluation is based. Therefore, by taking 
justice as the only motive for social interaction, society is implicitly seen 
as, in the last resort, consisting of a compilation of exchange relationships 
of otherwise isolated individuals. 
As we described in the second section, the concept of citizenship ex- 
plicitly points out that society, on the contrary, should not be regarded as 
built exclusively on exchange relationships of individuals. This claim has 
taken on different forms. We have described the distinction between a com- 
munitarian and a left-libertarian i terpretation f citizenship. The commu- 
nitarian approach focuses especially on the condition and the continuation 
of the social community. The other version of citizenship aims at the indi- 
vidual by means of stressing his status as a citizen who deserves more than 
just his fair share of economic and social rights, viz., genuine participation 
in the social community. 
Although differing at some points, both interpretations of citizenship 
should be seen as two sides of the same coin. Both stress the bond between 
individual and community. Etzioni (1988) speaks of an "I & We concept" 
that "keeps challenging both individuals and the community to redefine 
the bond so as to reduce the strain, even if it cannot be eliminated. This 
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is attempted, on the one side, by rendering the community to be more 
responsive to human nature . . . .  on the other, by improving the ability of 
individuals to function as members of a communi ty . . ,  and by enhancing 
civic obligations" (p. 82). Here, we see a reformulation of the foremen- 
tioned communitarian and left-libertarian enterprises. 
In this section, we elaborate on this rather abstract discussion and 
point out some concrete implications for theory and research on social jus- 
tice. Our first remark pertains to the existence of so-called prosocial be- 
havior that can only be explained by going beyond the justice motive and 
using the civic motive. This implies that social justice theory and research 
have to explore the lines that demarcate the situations in which the justice 
motive is predominant from those in which another motive prevails. 
Our next remark relates to the validity of the results from studies of 
everyday judgments of justice or fairness. The existence of an encompassing 
community of citizens means that, to a degree yet to be explored, justice 
judgments are necessarily the result of different motives, i.e., of the justice 
and the civic motive. This problem may be solved--as we argue--by meth- 
odological provisions, viz., an explicit specification of the conditions under 
which the judgments are given. 
Our third and last remark deals with the fact that the striving for 
justice has consequences for the social relationship of those concerned. 
These consequences can be seen as external effects that sometimes influ- 
ence the justice judgments people give. This prevents an easy interpretation 
of these judgments in terms of the priority given to criteria or reference 
groups. The implication for social justice theory and research is the need 
to use a more qualitative approach. 
Beyond the Justice Motive 
It is impossible for men to live together and be in regular contact with one another 
without their acquiring some feeling for the group which they constitute through 
having united together, without their becoming attached to it, concerning them- 
selves with its interest and taking it into account in their behavior. And this attach- 
ment to something that transcends the individual, this subordinat ion of the 
particular to the general interest, is the very well-spring of all moral activity. (Durk- 
helm, 1893/1984, p. xliii) 
This transcending of individual interests, as Durkheim calls it, con- 
stitutes a guideline of action which corresponds with what we have called 
a civic motive. Several studies demonstrate empirical evidence for the ex- 
istence of this civic motive. A classic example is the study of Titmuss (1970), 
who made an analysis of reasons people gave for donating blood. He found 
a substantial group of people acting on the basis of civic or altruistic mo- 
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tives: People gave blood without expecting any sort of service in return. 
According to Titmuss, the existence of a motive not based on reciprocity 
like the justice motive is especially important for modern welfare states 
where justice is to a large extent institutionalized. It should be avoided to 
rely exclusively on the market in order to create a fair balance between 
contribution and rewards, because, as Titmuss states, "the commercializa- 
tion of blood and donor relationships represses the expression of altruism, 
erodes the sense of community" (p. 245). So, though a regulation through 
the market, or, for that matter, through taxation might result in a fair dis- 
tribution of blood, going beyond a system of formalized exchange and dis- 
tribution enhances communal spirit. This spirit is necessary for the creating 
of an encompassing solidaristic ommunity and thus for the establishment 
of a firm basis of mutual trust which supports relationships guided by the 
justice motive. 
Another important study in this respect is that of Bellah et al. (1985). 
Unlike Titmuss, the authors did not find many examples of prosocial be- 
havior guided by altruistic or civic motives, but rather that their respondents 
regretted that these motives played but a subordinate role in their lives. 
Instead it appeared that the justice motive as a striving for fairness, for 
give-and-take, was widespread. Moreover, this motive was considered an 
ultimate form of individual self-reliance that "turns out to leave out very 
little place for interdependence and to correspond to a fairly grim view of 
the individual's place in the social world" (p. 15). Bellah et al. conclude 
that American citizens nowadays have lost the vocabulary of commitment, 
both in private and public affairs. The person who thinks in terms of the 
common good is, as the authors cite, a "sucker," because ach individual 
is pursuing his or her own interests: "In this moral vacuum, it has been 
tempting to translate group claims and interests into the language of indi- 
vidual rights, a language that makes sense in terms of our dominant indi- 
vidualistic ideology" (p. 207). When we evaluate the findings of this study 
in the light of our argument we see ourselves confronted with the fact that 
underneath t e apparent predominance of the justice motive, people look 
for other motives. Apparently, justice is not felt to be a sufficient guideline 
to live by. Therefore, the current reemergence of the concept of citizenship 
should not surprise us. 
In accordance with the outcomes of these two studies, social justice 
theory and research should be aware of the limitations of the justice con- 
cept. Naturally, there is a whole range of social situations wherein the jus- 
tice motive is the leading principle of action. Conflicts can arise out of 
differing evaluations of criteria and reference groups. However, in some 
occasions, the awareness of the community s predominant and people sub- 
ordinate or postpone their justice claims. This calls for further study of the 
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lines of demarcation between situations guided by the justice motive and 
those guided by the civic motive. The important differences and tensions 
between these two motives for social action can only be brought to light 
in this way. 
Some remarks must be made in order to understand this paragraph 
properly. First, we used altruistic and civic motives more or less as syno- 
nyms. In fact, it is better to see the civic motive as a specific form of al- 
truism on behalf of fellow citizens (and not close relatives or friends, etc.) 
and of the community as a whole (and not the family, etc.). Second, there 
has been an extensive dispute on the question whether altruistic--and for 
this reason civic--motives are ultimately guided by self-interest (see, for 
instance, Hechter, 1987) or not (see, for instance, Wolfe, 1989). We do 
not go into this discussion, but we confine ourselves to the remark that 
the results of the two forementloned studies cannot be explained without 
making a distinction between altruistic or civic motives on the one hand 
and justice motives on the other. 
Validity of Justice Judgments 
In the previous paragraph we stated that, in some instances, prosocial 
thoughts and behaviors can only be meaningfully explained by reference 
to a civic motive. This motive implies a limitation of the range of social 
situations in which the justice motive is predominant. In addition, the x- 
istence of a civic motive also questions the validity of the results from stud- 
ies of judgments of justice or fairness. The reason is that respondents, when 
asked to give a justice judgment, may at the same time be conscious of 
their own and other people's tatus as citizen, which--as we have seen--en- 
titles them to a certain level of provisions. This awareness complicates the 
interpretation of the results of justice studies, as is demonstrated in the 
following example. 
In several Dutch studies on the justice of income (Hermkens, 1983; 
Berting, 1991; Steijn and De Witte, 1991) evidence is found supporting the 
proposition that merit criteria are heavily preferred to those of need. These 
outcomes may be explained by the fact that the respondents strongly favor 
an achieving society. On the other hand, we should keep in mind that the 
respondents also know--and probably justify--that welfare state institutions 
are backing up the needy, at least to a certain degree. Therefore, they may 
find need criteria, such as the number of dependents in a household, ir- 
relevant for the working environment, because using these criteria would 
prevent a proper evaluation of work efforts and company results. If this 
line of thinking is correct, then the forementioned results have to be in- 
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terpreted in a totally different way. Instead of concluding that the respon- 
dents hold the opinion that incomes hould be distributed according to 
merit, we must take the possibility into account hat the respondents hink 
that need is an important criterion for income too, but that this is not the 
responsibility of the firm. 
This means that, in order to assess the validity of a justice judgment, 
respondents have to be told explicitly which frame of reference they should 
use. This creates a transparent social situation in which the evaluation of 
the balance between inputs and outcomes can be optimally made. If we 
follow our example, this methodological requirement confines the question 
of just incomes to the workplace and enables us to draw conclusions with 
regard to the order of the preferred criteria for the allocation of income. 
We have to keep in mind that these justice judgments are only valid under 
restricted conditions. 
The need to specify these conditions explicitly accounts for the popu- 
larity of the experimental method in studying social justice. When the sub- 
jects enter the abstract world of the experimental situation---of which they 
are aware--their only guideline for action and judgment is the fair balance 
of inputs and outcomes. Thus, the requirement for specified conditions is 
easily met. The creation of an abstract world, however, limits the validity 
of these experimental results. In everyday life justice judgments mix up with 
judgments arising from a civic motive to a degree we have to explore fur- 
ther. This brings us to our final remark. 
Justice and Its Consequences 
We have argued that justice judgments are valid under restricted con- 
ditions where isolated individuals are negotiating their respective input- 
outcome balances. This raises a new question: How do people react when 
confronted with the necessity of making these restrictions? Under experi- 
mental conditions, this will probably not be an obstacle as the experimental 
situation is a specific excision of the social world, governed by a limited 
set of explicit rules. This means that n experiment is a game in which the 
decisions and judgments made have no consequences that reach further 
than the doors of the laboratory. The question is whether this is the same 
in normal, everyday life. 
The concept of citizenship shows the awareness of the consequences 
that the adherence and appliance of justice rules have for the community. 
An example may clarify this point. In a study on risky life-styles as criteria 
for the distribution of health care (Bernts, 1988), it appeared that an eq- 
uity-based treatment of risky behavior was rejected by several respondents, 
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because of the expected consequences of assessing these risky behaviors. 
These respondents apparently feared the loss of their privacy and auton- 
omy; a fear that influenced their justice judgments. This result shows that 
people are aware of the fact that justice judgments require an intersubjec- 
tive assessment of inputs and outcomes, i.e., highly formalized social rela- 
tionships. 
A quite similar example can be taken from the work of Gilligan 
(1982) on gender-specific judgments of justice. In a critical analysis of Kohl- 
berg's (1981) research on moral development, Gilligan discussed the ap- 
parent result that men attained a higher level of moral judgment. She 
rejected this interpretation and stated instead that women are more than 
men inclined to incorporate the effects of the justice rule that is applied 
in their justice judgments. Therefore they arrive at other judgments. Gilli- 
gan concluded that a female ethic of care should be distinguished from a 
male ethic of justice. In an ethic of care the appliance of justice rules is 
postponed or even abandoned in view of the consequences for the social 
situation. 
In analogy with Giltigan's line of argument, people may postpone or 
abandon justice judgments in order not to endanger the community of in- 
dividuals. When we consider our previous example of the judgments on 
income distribution for a moment, it is possible that some respondents do 
not apply merit criteria, not because they find them unimportant, but be- 
cause they fear external effects of this strategy of rewarding, e.g., enhancing 
distrust or calculating behavior. In our opinion, the implication of the fore- 
going argument is that the study of social justice should be based more 
extensively on qualitative methods. Detailed reports of arguments on mat- 
ters of justice can give us insight in the way people balance justice and 
civic motives. Consequentialist arguments and the vocabulary of citizenship 
in general can thus be brought o light. 
CONCLUSION 
We have shown that the concept of citizenship sharpens our under- 
standing of the range and limits of the object of social justice theory and 
research. We have pointed out that the justice motive constitutes a guide- 
line for action that in some respects i  at odds with the notion of citizenship 
which requires that people consider each other as citizens with entitle- 
ments. Moreover, the limited range of the justice approach enhances the 
utility and validity of the very concept. Social justice offers only a clear 
guideline for individuals in specific situations, e.g., in economic transactions 
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or in administrative procedures. This guideline is used alongside other val- 
ues and motives like, as is described here at length, that of citizenship. 
The complex interplay of these motives in everyday situations con- 
fronts theory and research on social justice with a difficult but challenging 
problem to unravel. We have made some proposals to start with. First, the 
lines of demarcation between situations guided by the justice motive and 
by the civic motive need to be studied more closely. Second, researchers 
have to specify the conditions on which the respondents hould base their 
judgment explicitly. And last, the complex interplay of justice and civic mo- 
tives in everyday situations may be studied better by a more qualitative 
approach. 
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